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Abstract Happiness and utility are two types of subjective well-being, but measured in
different ways. Happiness is measured by asking people questions about their subjective
appreciation of their life as a whole. Utility is measured by an assessment of their sub-
jective priorities, as revealed in their actual behaviour. Both methods have specific pros
and cons and additional value. These methodological issues are important in an episte-
mological way: how to obtain knowledge about subjective well-being. There are, however,
also three important ontological differences between happiness and utility in the actual
nature of these phenomena in reality. (1) Happiness depends on available market and non-
market commodities and living-conditions; utility depends only on available market-
commodities. (2) Happiness is about experienced well-being, utility is about expected
well-being. (3) Happiness is limited because it is related to the fulfilment of a limited
number of needs, utility is unlimited because behaviour always reveals preferences in
terms of expected well-being. Economists and happiness-researchers tend to neglect the
last two differences. Their analysis, the analysis of Carol Graham included, could gain
strength if more attention would be paid to these last two differences.
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1 Introduction
Carol Graham is an economist and the author of numerous books and articles on poverty,
inequality, and novel measures of well-being. Her latest book ‘‘Happiness around the
World’’ is interesting and very informative. She evaluates very accurately the relations
between happiness and variables like income, health, marital status and employment and
applies sophisticated statistical procedures to assess possible causality in such relations.
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Graham is cautious but optimistic about the importance of happiness-research for
policymakers.
2 Graham’s Book
2.1 Graham’s Inventory of Causes and Consequences of Happiness
Graham identifies income, age, health and marital status as important determinants for the
level and the distribution of happiness in general. The impact of other variables on hap-
piness, like gender, education and employment, depends on contextual factors like gender
rights, returns on education and the position of retired people and the self-employed.
Subjective variables, like optimism, adaptation, and the acceptance of inequality, help to
explain some irregularities. Graham demonstrates that several factors have a two-way
causal relationship with happiness; having an impact on happiness but simultaneously
being influenced by it. In a panel-study in Russia she evaluates such relations by using the
unexplained or residual individual happiness in 1995 as an independent variable to predict
developments after 1995. The residual happiness appears to predict future income and
health, but not getting married or divorced, or becoming unemployed. The positive impact
of happiness on income and health underlines the social-economic importance of
happiness.
2.2 Graham’s Inventory of Paradoxes in the Relationship Between Income
and Happiness
The relation between income and happiness gets a lot of attention in Graham’s book.
Wealthier people are in general happier than poorer ones, but Graham describes three
paradoxes.
(a) The paradox of the unhappy economic growth: Countries with higher GDP per capita
have higher levels of happiness, but controlling for these levels of GDP per capita indi-
viduals have lower levels of happiness in countries with positive growth rates (research by
Eduardo Lora and collaborators 2009). The accompanying dislocation of rapid growth
apparently undermines the positive effect of higher income levels.
(b) The paradox of the happy peasant and the frustrated achiever: This happens for
instance in China where urban migrants are materially better off than they were before they
migrated, but they report higher levels of frustration. Once they migrate their reference
norm quickly becomes other urban residents rather than their previous peers in rural areas.
(c) The paradox of the optimistic poor people: Within countries wealthier respondents
are happier, but there is clearly an ‘optimism bias’ in the responses of the poorest
respondents. Their expectations are very low and the impact of misery on their happiness is
therefore rather modest. Even the substantial income-inequality in Latin America is not
matched by a comparable difference in satisfaction with the material and economic quality
of life.
Relative income within nations seems to matter for happiness. This is one of the
explanations for the Easterlin paradox: relative income matters for individual happiness
within societies, but average happiness is rather insensitive for economic growth if some
minimal GDP-level per capita is reached. An alternative explanation is adaptation of
expectations. Expectations rise in good conditions, like high levels of freedom, and go
down in bad conditions, like high levels of crime or corruption. Downward adaptation is an
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important survival mechanism at times of adversity. Rising expectations may have pro-
vided impetus to rising ambitions and to the remarkable progress humanity has made in
areas such as technology and health. In Graham’s view it is difficult to judge whether rising
expectations or downward adaptations are good or bad things; they are likely part of human
nature.
2.3 Graham’s Inventory of Policy Implications of Happiness-Research
In the last chapter Graham evaluates the policy-implications of happiness-research. What
can policymakers take from the findings so far? Graham makes some cautionary remarks
but she also presents some positive conclusions.
(a) Cautionary remarks: A fundamental problem is whether happiness should be a
policy objective in the first place. Are happy people successful or complacent? There is
evidence that happy people perform better in the labour market and that they are healthier.
But the evidence also suggests that there is a top limit to this. People who score a 10 are
successful, but people who score somewhat lower (7–9) are more successful. A related
problem in Graham’s view is the importance of happiness as a purpose, relative to alter-
native purposes like growth, policy reforms, and fiscal stability. There are temporal con-
siderations as well. Many reforms make people unhappy in the short term but produce
more happiness in the long run.
(b) Positive conclusions: Happiness surveys have great promise in Graham’s view for
helping to understand a variety of phenomena which cannot be explained by standard
optimal choice or revealed preferences approaches. Two sets of questions come to the
fore. The first is the welfare effects of macro and institutional arrangements that indi-
viduals are powerless to change, such as macroeconomic volatility, inequality, or weak
government structures. In such situations people, and in particular the poor, are unable to
express their preferences. The second set of questions is those in which behaviours are
not the result of preferences but of norms, addiction, self-control problems and undue
expectations. If people have low expectations for their own and their children’s future
their decisions on any number of fronts, ranging from investing in their children’s
education to saving and public health attitudes, could be compromised. Another promise
for happiness surveys is in the understanding of non-income variables, such as health,
education, employment status, gender rights and environment. In Graham’s view hap-
piness can ultimately complement standard income-based measures as a measure for the
quality of life. In the same way that GDP allows us to track economic growth within and
across countries, national-well-being measures like happiness provide a complementary
tool for assessing welfare trends.
3 My Comments
I find that happiness can be discussed in three ways: in an epistemological way, in an
evaluative or normative way, or in an ontological way. The epistemological discussion is
about how we can obtain knowledge about happiness, the evaluative discussion is about
happiness as a moral value or policy objective, and the ontological discussion is about the
nature of happiness in reality. Graham’s book is primarily epistemological: but hardly
evaluative or ontological. She is positive about happiness as a measure for the quality of
life and she identifies some specific opportunities to use happiness in situations where
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revealed preferences are inadequate as a source of information.1 Her book is hardly
evaluative; she only makes some evaluative remarks about happiness as a policy objective.
Her book is not very ontological either, because there are at least three important differ-
ences between neoclassical utility and happiness, and she only makes some remarks about
the first difference. The three differences are:
1. happiness is a more comprehensive indicator than utility,
2. happiness is about experienced well-being, utility is about expected well-being,
3. happiness is limited, utility is unlimited.
Difference 1: happiness is more comprehensive: In Graham’s view the study of hap-
piness is part of a more general move in economics that challenges the narrow neoclassical
assumptions that people maximize utility. Happiness economics relies on a more expansive
notion of utility, including interdependent utility functions, procedural utility, and the
interaction between rational and non-rational influences in determining economic behav-
iour. At this point she recognizes happiness as a more comprehensive indicator for
subjective well-being than the neoclassical concept of utility.
Happiness depends not only on goods and services available on the market, but also on
non-market commodities and living conditions. Graham mentions some examples of
non-market-commodities: health, gender rights and environment. She also might have
mentioned freedom, personal autonomy, social trust and companionship, as put forward by
Putman (2000) and Lane (2000).
Difference 2: happiness is about experienced well-being, utility is about expected well-
being: Another difference is that happiness is based on actual experienced well-being (ex
post or current), while utility is based on expected well-being (ex ante) because choices are
based on expectations. The difference between experiences and expectations is important
even though they can be highly interconnected. Expectations can arise from hearsay,
papers, books, soaps and imagination, but are also highly dependent on experiences.
Experiences of subjective well-being, on the other hand, can be highly influenced by
relevant expectations. In the national shipping museum in Antwerp I learned about the
happiness of people who immigrated by ship to the US around 1900. Many of them left a
difficult life behind them, with poverty and repression, and the actual conditions on the
ships were far from pleasant. These people were nevertheless very happy on the ship,
because they expected a better life. The contrast between their experienced past and their
expected future created strong emotions. Even if the ‘best-worst’ question would have been
used they would have reported high happiness levels. This question is formulated as
follows: Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you
and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. Where on this
ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time (0–10). Strictly speaking the
qualification ‘at the present time’ invites people to disregard their expectations, but people
probably disregard this invitation. Even with this question the immigrants on the ship
probably would have reported high happiness levels. On the other hand, however, most of
our daily experiences take place without any specific expectations. At this point we may
posit that, in the interaction between experiences and expectations, experience will be the
dominant factor, and probably becomes more dominant when we get older. This domi-
nancy of actual experience is also visible in the strong relation between happiness and
actual conditions like safety and wealth. Peasants may be happy occasionally, and
1 See Ott (2010) for a systematic inventory of the differences between revealed and stated preferences and
self-reported happiness as sources of information.
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millionaires miserable, but empirical data tell a convincing story about this relation in
general. We have to keep in mind, however, that expectations can be an interfering factor.
The relationship between actual conditions on the one hand, and happiness or utility on the
other, can be rather loose in specific situations by the impact of expectations.2 The gap
between conditions and happiness will be smaller usually than the gap between conditions
and utility. In that respect happiness is a more representative indicator for the ‘objective’
quality of life.
Difference 3: happiness is limited, utility is unlimited: Utility has no maximum and it
can only to be measured at an ordinal level. This is consistent with economic theory:
human wants are endless and are always expressed in choices people make, as revealed in
their behaviour. These choices are always based on expected well-being and always
produce additional utility. There will never be any limit. A dominant assumption in
happiness-research on the other hand is that happiness depends on the gratification of a
limited number of basic needs.3 In the terminology of Veenhoven (2009): ‘Needs are
inborn and universal while ‘wants’ are acquired and can be variable across cultures’.4
Happiness will reach a maximum level if inborn needs are satisfied. This assumption is
supported by the fact that in wealthy nations average happiness is very stable at a high
level, also in periods of rapid economic growth.5 There is, however, a complication: it is
one of the basic needs to use and further develop inborn or innate capabilities.6 People
always want to be active and creative, and they always need challenges. Even if they have
reached their maximum level of happiness they will produce utility, in order to stay at that
maximum.
4 Conclusion
Graham’s book is a great contribution to our knowledge of subjective well-being, but her
analysis would have gained more strength if she would have paid more attention to the
second and third difference between happiness and utility. One example: if happiness has
indeed a maximum the positive contribution of any factor, be it objective like wealth or
subjective like optimism, is inevitably characterized by diminishing returns. This implies a
2 Warning: expectations about happiness can be very wrong, as has been nicely demonstrated by Daniel
Gilbert is his ‘Stumbling on happiness’ (2007).
3 A well-known typology is presented by A. Maslow: (1) physiological, (2) safety, (3) love/belonging, (4)
esteem, (5) self-actualization. A more sophisticated typology is presented by Wentholt (1980) in terms of
motivation:
(1) Organic basic motivations, (1a) based on homeostatic principles (hunger, thirst, sexuality), (1b) based
on stimulation-seeking (intrinsic motivation and affection). Wentholt additionally presents some compli-
cations in the actual dynamics of such motivations by the (typical human) consciousness, like consciousness
of our emotions, existential conditions and individual identity.
4 As reported by Nettle (2005) this distinction between basic needs and wanting, or between liking and
wanting as he puts it, hangs together with the fact that we have different sub-systems in our brain to regulate
liking and wanting.
5 As a consequence happiness can be measured at a cardinal level with numerical scales, like the 0–10
ladder-scale as it is used by Gallup. This is possible because respondents are able to divide the range
between zero and the maximum in equal parts, representing comparable differences in their subjective
appreciation. This cardinal option is not available in the measurement of utility, because utility has no
maximum.
6 In Maslow’s typology self-actualization, in Wentholt’s typology stimulation-seeking motivations and in
particular intrinsic motivation.
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different reality and requires a different analysis. It also presents an additional explanation
for the Easterlin paradox. And what about policy-implications? If there is indeed a max-
imum to happiness, and if this maximum is achieved in nations by a reasonable level of
material wealth, individual freedom, security, healthcare, and an accepted level of
inequality, would this be the end of politics and policy? Obviously not. If people are happy
they will try to keep it up and in order to keep it up they will still have to be active and
creative. They will, in economic language, still create more utility. Some basic realities
will be different, however. Economic growth will no longer be an instrument for additional
happiness, but only a consequence of the fact that people need to be active. Perhaps our
wants are nowadays manipulated and blown up by commercial interests, but we cannot do
without them. Such conclusions are interesting, also in normative and evaluative discus-
sions about politics and policy. Perhaps the problems of unhappy people deserve a higher
priority than the problems of the happy ones, and perhaps all happiness-problems can be
solved simultaneously!
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